State of Delaware v. Brown.
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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE RICHARD R. COOCH RESIDENT JUDGE NEW CASTLE COU NTY COUR THOUSE 500 N. KING STREET, SUITE 10400 WILMINGTO N, DELAWAR E 19801 (302) 255-0664 Paul R. Wallace, Esquire Deputy Attorney General Department of Justice Carvel State Office Building 820 North French Street Wilmington, Delaware 19801 Gregory M. Johnson, Esquire Cross & Associates LLC 913 North Market Street, Suite 1001 P.O. Box 1380 Wilmington, Delaware 19899 Submitted: September 13, 2004 Decided: September 17, 2004 Re: State v. Anthony L. Brown I.D. # 0312004556 On Defendant s Motion to Withdraw Pleas of Guilty DENIED. Dear C ounsel: Defendant, through his former attorney Jan A.T. van Amerongen, Esquire filed a Motion to Withdraw Pleas of Guilty on May 27, 2004. He had been scheduled for sentencing on May 14, 2004. Mr. Johnson subsequently was appoin ted to rep resent D efendan t. Defen dant had entered g uilty pleas to Robbery First D egree an d to Possession of a Firearm By a Person Prohibited on March 15, 2004. Defendant s motion (ΒΆ 10) states that he did not fully understand his trial rights and that he therefore did not make a knowing intelligent and voluntary decision to enter his guilty pleas. Specifically, Mr. Brown asserted that he did not understand that he, through his counsel, would have the ability to confront and question Wade Tucker in front of the jury. Motion at paragraph 10. The State by letter of June 10, 2004 to the Court, suggested that with such allegation having been made there must be an evidentiary hearing at which the testimon y of M r. van A meron gen mu st be pres ented. The Court finally (on September 13) received a transcript of the March 15, 2004 c olloquy (after hav ing ord ered it in late June). A copy of the transc ript is enclosed for cou nsel. When a defendant enters a guilty plea, [t]here are numerous protections afforded to the defendant. [Citation omitted]. Prior to accepting a guilty plea, the trial judge must address the defendant in open court. Some rville v. State , 703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1997). During the guilty plea colloquy, [t]he judge must determine that the defendant understands the nature of the charges and penalties provided for each of the offenses. [Citation omitted]. The record must reflect that the defendant understands that the guilty plea constitutes a waiver of a trial on the charges and a waiver of the co nstitution al rights to which he or she wou ld have b een entitled to exercise at a trial. Some rville, 703 A.2d 631-632. The Delaware Suprem e Court emphasized the need through "direct interrogation of the defendant," to establish a record of the factual basis for a plea of guilty, including an understanding of the consequences of his plea and tha t "he has discussed with his attorney fully the entry of his plea of guilty." Patterso n v. State, 684 A.2d 1234, 1236 (quoting Brown v. State, 250 A.2d 503, 505 (Del. Super. 1969) (emphasis added). However, after reviewing the transcript of the colloquy of the guilty plea, the Court has concluded that no sufficient showing has been made for the scheduling of an evidentiary hearing to explore Defendant s assertion further. Superior Court Criminal Rule 32(d) provides that this Court may permit withdraw of the plea upon a showing by the Defendant of any fair and just reason. Rule 32(d) permits the Court, prior to the implementation of the sentence, to allow the defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty upon a showing by the defendant of "any fair and just reason." The rule contemplates that permission to withdraw a plea prior to sentencing is usually granted more liberally than after sentencing; however, the burden is upon the defendant to show sufficient reasoning to meet the fair and just standard. In reviewing these motions, Courts have considered the follow ing facto rs: (a) Was there a procedural defect in taking the plea[?];(b) Did the defendant knowingly and voluntarily consent to the plea agreement[?];(c) Does the defendant presently have a basis to assert legal innocence[?];(d) Did the defendant have adequate legal counsel throughout the proceedings[?]; and(f) Does granting the motion prejudice the State or unduly inconvenience the Court[? ] State v. Friend, 1994 Del. Super. LEXIS 229 *3 -4 (Del. Super.). The only issue raised by Brown is the knowingly and voluntarily factor. Defendant s assertion that he did not make a knowing intelligent and voluntary decision to enter his guilty pleas is not supported by the transcripts of the guilty plea colloquy: At the b eginnin g of the c olloquy , Mr. va n Am eronge n stated: AI first spo ke with Mr. Brown regarding the facts as we then knew them to be at the preliminary hearing in this matter. I met with him on several occasions since then. We had been employed [sic] with automatic discovery, were supplied with supplemental discove ry we h ad requ ested, inclu ding six videotap es and ad ditional p olice repo rts. We had discussed the facts of the case as well as potential defense[s] at trial. Mr. Brow n has op ted to acce pt the off er that has just been described and is n ow in agreement with same between himself and State. It is my belief that his intention to do so is voluntary, intelligent and knowingly made and I request that your Honor accept the plea. (Tr., p. 2, line 23; p. 3, lines 1 13). $ In respo nse to the Court s question , Have y ou freely and vo luntarily decided to plead guilty to the charges listed in your written plea agreement? , Defendant answered A Yes. (Tr., p. 4, lines 14 17). $ The Defendant acknowledged reviewing with Mr. van A merongen all the constitutional rights that he had that were set forth on the Guilty Plea Form, and further that he w ished to waive or give up each a nd every one of those constitutional rights and enter a plea of guilty to the two charges. (Tr., p. 5, lines 1 8). One of the constitutional rights there listed was Defendant s right to hear and question the witnesses against you. He elsewhere acknowledged on the Guilty Plea from that he had received and understood all the information contained in the [guilty plea] form. $ The Defendant stated to the Court that he believed he was know ingly, intellig ently and volunta rily was e ntering a plea of g uilty to bo th charges . $ Defendant further advised that he had reviewed the plea agreement with his attorney and had signed it. (Tr., p.6, lines 1-5). $ Lastly, the Court asked the Defendant: Do you understand [that] wh at is being done is f inal, mean ing you will not b e able at a late r time to withdraw your guilty pleas in these charges; do you understand that? To that penultimate question, Defendant answered Yes. (Tr., p. 7, lines 19 - 23, p. 8, lines 1 4 ). * * * The law is clear that a mere assertion by a defendant, post-guilty plea, that the defendant did not understand a constitutional right being waived is not sufficien t to allow a guilty ple a to be w ithdraw n, (State v. Melendez, 2003 D el. Super . LEX IS 409 *20 (D el. Supe r.) (hold ing that a d efendan t s bald state ments that simply contradict what he said at his plea allocution are not sufficient grounds to withdraw the guilty plea )) much less to require this Court to take the step of holding a formal evidentiary hearing so the Defendant can explore this assertion further. Melendez, 2003 Del. Super. LEXIS 409 *2 2 (holding that Melendez was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing unless, [he] submits specific factual allegations not directly contradicted in the record of circumstances undermining his plea ) . A defendant s statements to the Superior Court during the guilty plea colloqu y, with o r witho ut the w itness oath , are presu med to b e truthfu l. Some rville, 703 A.2d 632. Representations made by a defendant at the plea colloquy, as well as any findings made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings. Melendez, 2003 Del. Super. LEXIS 409 *16 (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977)). For the foregoing reason s, Defendant s Motion to Withdraw Pleas of Guilty is DEN IED. Sentencing will take place on Friday, October 15, 2004 at 1:15 P .M.. IT IS SO ORDERED. Very truly yours, RRC /mtc cc: Prothonotary Jan van Amerongen, Esquire Investigative Services
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